In this paper we analyze the effects of some distortions induced by prospective payment system, i.e. Upcoding, Cream Skimming and Readmissions on hospitals' technical efficiency. We estimate a production function using a population-based dataset composed by all active hospitals in an Italian region, Lombardy, during the period 1998-2007. We show that cream skimming and upcoding have a negative impact on hospitals' technical efficiency, while readmissions have a positive effect. Moreover, we find that private hospitals are more engaged in cream skimming than public and not-for-profit ones, while we observe no ownership differences regarding upcoding. Not-for-profit hospitals have the highest readmission index. Last, not-for-profit and public hospitals have the same efficiency levels, while private hospitals have the lowest technical efficiency. 
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In many industrialized countries, the Prospective Payment System (PPS) is a pillar of the health care sector. Under PPS hospitals receive a pre-determined rate for each admission. Each patient is classified into a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) according to the clinical information reported in the Hospital Discharge Chart (HDC). The PPS has been adopted, in place of incurred cost reimbursement, to improve the sector's efficiency by introducing financial incentives aimed at encouraging a more cost-efficient management of medical care.
1 However, under this reimbursement scheme, the hospitals' managers have also the incentives to adopt some opportunistic practices (Barbetta et al. (2007) , p. 82), which, in turn, may affect hospitals' technical efficiency.
The literature has provided several theoretical contributions on these distortions (e.g. Ellis (1998) , Barros (2003) ), but little evidence is available on their magnitude and on their effect on hospitals' technical efficiency. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap, by targeting three goals: first, we develop an econometric analysis to investigate how these distortions influence hospitals' production function. Second we investigate whether private, not-forprofit and public hospitals exhibit behavioral differences on these distortions.
Last, we analyze, having taken into account the impact of the distortions on the production frontier, whether there is a difference in technical efficiency among public, not-for-profit and private hospitals. To achieve these goals, we design some indices for computing the magnitude of each distortion at the hospital level.
In this contribution we focus on three distortions: upcoding, cream skimming and readmissions. The upcoding practice consists in classifying a pa-1 As stated by Barbetta et al. (2007) , many contributions, especially those investigating the US market, point out that a reimbursement system based on incurred costs does not provide incentives to both cost containment and price competition among hospitals.
1 tient in a DRG that produces a higher reimbursement.
2 Several definitions of cream skimming in the health care sector are available in literature. Ellis (1998) points out that cream skimming consists in the selection of the more lucrative patients; 3 Levaggi and Montefiori (2003) distinguish between cream skimming as treatment selection (i.e. "horizontal" cream skimming)
and cream skimming as patient selection within the same ailment group (i.e.
"vertical" cream skimming). Under the first practice, the hospital chooses to provide only the more lucrative and less severe treatments. Given the features of our dataset, we focus only on the horizontal definition of cream skimming, i.e. treatment cream skimming. Last, the readmission practice implies that the same patient is discharged and admitted again after a short period, so that the hospital receives for the same treatment more than one reimbursement.
Our investigation revealed several significant empirical results. First, we
show that upcoding and cream skimming have a negative impact on the hospitals' output, hence decreasing their overall production frontier. Furthermore, readmissions have a positive impact, implying that those hospitals more engaged in this practice have a higher output. However this increase in the total number of treatments might be due to an opportunistic managerial behaviour and not to an efficiency effect. Second, we find evidence that, differently from previous investigations (e.g. Zuckerman et al. (1994) , 2 Simborg (1981) defines upcoding or "DRG creep" as a "deliberate and systematic shift in a hospitals reported case-mix to improve reimbursement" by changing the order of the principal and secondary diagnoses.
3 Ellis (1998) highlights that payment incentives influence both the intensity of services and the patients who are treated. Moreover he identifies three strategies that providers may adopt in response to PPS: "creaming", "skimping" and "dumping". The former strategy is defined as the "over-provision of services to low severity patients"; skimping is instead the "under-provision of services to high severity patients"; dumping is the "explicit avoidance of high severity patients".
2 Vitaliano and Toren (1996) , Puig-Junoy (1998) , Sloan (2000) , Barbetta et al. (2007) ), not-for-profit hospitals exhibit the same level of technical efficiency than public ones, while private hospitals are less efficient (even if we observe that they tend to converge to the efficiency of the other two types at the end of the observed period). Third, private hospitals are involved in cream skimming at a much higher rate than public and not-for-profit ones.
Fourth, there is no ownership difference in upcoding, while the use of this distortion is increasing during the period of investigation across all hospital's types. Fifth, not-for-profit hospitals show the highest adoption of readmission practice. Last, the regional technical efficiency has an increasing trend during 1998-2007.
We achieve these results by applying an econometric analysis to a balanced panel consisting of the entire population of 134 Italian hospitals active in the Lombardy Region during the period of 1998-2007. 4 In Italy health care is managed at a regional level, and many differences exist across regions.
In this paper the analysis of the distortions' impact on hospitals' technical efficiency has been applied to the wealthiest and most populated Italian region.
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We run our analysis on a comprehensive dataset based on administrative data, which covers the main inputs and outputs at hospital level for the entire regional population. Hence we are able to estimate a hospital production function, and to measure its efficiency by computing the deviation from the maximum achievable target (i.e. its efficiency score). We adopt stochastic frontier models and, in order to test the robustness of our results to different 4 Lombardy has 9.5 million inhabitants (16% of the total) and produces 25% of the Italian GDP. Regarding the econometric models, we consider the Random Effects Model (henceforth RE) proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981) and the True Random Effects Model (henceforth TRE) developed by Greene (2005a Greene ( , 2005b ). The former model estimates a time invariant efficiency level for each hospital.
Hence it does not consider whether a hospital has became more or less efficient during the period of analysis. In the TRE model, efficiency is not constant over time and it is possible to distinguish it from latent hospital heterogeneity.
Our work is linked to a limited number of investigations that have studied the adoption of PPS induced distortions by different hospitals' ownership forms. Silverman and Skinner (2004) In medicine comorbidity describes the presence in a patient of other diseases in ad-4 trend increase in the readmission rate in the US after the introduction of the PPS. Our contribution extends his analysis by computing the readmission rate for all the possible DRGs, and by proposing a refinement of the readmission's proxy. Louis et al. (1999) provide evidence of the impact of the PPS on readmissions in Italy. They show that the introduction of PPS does not give rise to an increase in readmission rate. However, the proxy they adopt to compute this distortion may be too wide for medical conditions.
Our contribution, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to estimate the impact of PPS distortions on hospitals' technical efficiency.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we show the proxies adopted to compute the PPS distortions, in Section 3 we present the econometric models. The dataset and the Italian institutional setting are reported in Section 4, while Section 5 presents both the estimates hospitals' technical efficiency and some evidence on the distribution of upcoding, cream skimming and readmissions according to hospital ownership. Furthermore, it investigates whether there is a difference in technical efficiency among public, not-for-profit and private hospitals. The main conclusions of the paper are reported in Section 6, which ends up our contribution.
dition to the primary one. Several indexes have been developed to quantify comorbidity (see de Groot et al. (2003) ). The most widely used are the Charlson Comorbidity Index (see Charlson et al. (1987) ) and the Elixhauser Index (see Elixhauser et al. (1998) 
As mentioned previously, we focus on three distortions: upcoding, cream skimming and readmissions. Our first step in the analysis is to design some proxies to compute them.
The upcoding index
Concerning upcoding, we can start from the contributions provided by Dafny (2005) and Silverman and Skinner (2004) . Dafny (2005) adopts the following proxy to compute upcoding: she considers all the DRG pairs with and without complications and defines upcoding as the ratio of hospitals' discharges in the DRGs with complications over the total number of discharges in the DRG pair (i.e. the sum of discharges with and without complications in a given DRG pair). Her contribution shows that the management changes the intensity of upcoding in response to variation in the prices reimbursed under the PPS, but it does not take into account that the total number of discharges with complications may be influenced, on top of upcoding, also by the patient's sickness status. If the health status of the population becomes worse, hospitals may register a higher number of patients with complications. Silverman and Skinner (2004) do consider the patient's health status, but do not disentangle it from the proxy they propose for upcoding. They study only four DRGs concerning general respiratory ailments, one of which has a DRG weight much higher than the others because of the presence of complications. Their proxy for upcoding is given by the ratio of hospital's discharges in the DRG with complications and higher DRG weight over the sum (in the same hospital) of the discharges in all the four DRGs considered.
In order to take into account the patient's sickness status, Silverman and Skinner (2004) compare the difference in the hospitals' trends for upcoding and patients' health status, using as a proxy the Charlson Comorbidity Index.
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They observe different trends and, consequently, conclude that the increasing trend in upcoding is mainly due to opportunistic behaviour.
We believe that, to identify upcoding, it is necessary to disentangle the share of hospital's discharges with complications between those due to the patients' sickness status and those induced by the opportunistic managerial behaviour. Only the latter can be classified as upcoding. The Comorbodity Index (CI, with 0 ≤ CI ≤ 1) is a good indicator of the patient health status at the time of admission. Hence we define s
as the share of discharges with complications (y C it ) over the total discharges in a specific DRG (y
This share is then compared with the same share but computed at the regional level, i.e. s shows whether hospital i at period t is treating more complicated cases than the regional average (the ratio is greater than 1) or not. Furthermore we divide this ratio by the comorbidity index CI it (computed using the Elixhauser Index (1998)); the result is as proxy of the hospital's upcoding activity.
8 This implies the following index for upcoding:
th (14 th ) of the Grouper software (the application produced by 3M and adopted to assign the DRG to each discharge) identifies 118 (112) pairs of DRGs with and without complications. Hence upcoding is a distortion that may only arise in only 236
DRGs out of about 500.
8 As an example, let us suppose that hospital i has Furthermore, CI i = 0.5, i.e. in hospital i the comorbidity index is equal to 50%, which means that half of the patients are admitted with long-term health problems. Then from
(1) hospital i upcoding activity is equal to 3. On the contrary, CI j = 0.8, i.e. in hospital j 80% of the patients have health problems. Hospital j upcoding activity is equal to 1.875.
The two hospitals have the same number of complicated cases but the former makes 60% more upcoding than the latter.
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The treatment cream skimming index
The literature does not provide, to the best of our knowledge, any attempts to estimate the treatment cream skimming. Hence what we present below should be considered as a first attempt to compute it. As mentioned before, with this distortion the management chooses the treatments to provide. In order to compute it, we assume that the opportunistic behaviour (which is unobservable) is less likely the higher the number of DRGs per ward provided by an hospital. If hospital i has the same number of wards than hospital j but less DRGs per ward, it is likely that treatment selection is occurring, i.e.
hospital i is focusing on some DRGs. Hence our cream skimming index is given by the following expression:
where N DRG it is the total number of DRGs with more than 10 discharges during a year treated in hospital i at time t, 10 and N W ARD it represents the total number of wards in hospital i at time t and N DRGt N W ARDt q is the q th percentile of the regional distribution of the ratio between these two indicators in period t (with q = {10, 90}). The ratio between the number of DRGs and wards takes into account the relationship between the breadth of the hospital's inpatient activity and the hospital size. The higher the ratio, the less treatment cream skimming is observed in the hospital. The underlying idea is 9 The proposed specification has been designed after several interviews performed with regional health officers in charge of the PPS. 10 In order to reduce the risk of underestimating cream skimming in a specific hospital we consider only the usual hospital activity, and so we rule out the DRGs only occasionally treated, i.e. those few discharges on a specific DRG that are treated only under exceptional circumstances. The threshold has been fixed at 10 discharges per year.
8 that the lower the number of DRGs treated per ward in a hospital, the more specialized the hospital is. However, a high value of CRSK it may be due both to health services concentration and to the selection of the more lucrative activities. To distinguish these effects we compare the hospital's number of DRGs per ward with the regional distribution of the same ratio. 
The readmission index
In this case the opportunistic behaviour consists in readmitting a patient after a short time in order to get further reimbursements. Cutler (1995) , that analyzes the impact on the patient's sickness status after the introduction of PPS in the US of some variables related with the treatments provided by the hospitals, computes it as the number of discharges in the same hospital during a year. However, since this proxy is computed at hospital level, it may include a readmission due to a different disease from the initial one, which cannot be classified as a distortion.
We believe that two features have to be present for a readmission being classified as the result of a managerial opportunistic behaviour: (1) the readmission has to be for the same disease of the initial admission; (2) it should occur quite shortly after the first discharge. Hence the proxy we adopt for readmission is the following one:
where y it,∆ represents the total number of readmissions in the same hospital 11 We have also run the analysis shown in Section 5 with a continuous index of cream skimming, and we have found no difference in the results.
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for the same Major Diagnostic Category (MDC) and within ∆ days from the date of the initial discharge, while y it is the total number of admissions in hospital i at time t.
In Section 5 we will provide some descriptive evidence regarding the distortion indexes presented in this Section, and we will investigate whether there exist behavioral differences according to the hospital ownership types.
The estimation of technical efficiency
Efficiency is a concept related with measuring the performance of a productive unit. The latter may be investigated under two perspectives: (1) whether the unit is not wasting resources, i.e. it is producing the maximum feasible level of output given the amount of inputs involved in the production process (technical efficiency); (2) whether the unit is choosing the best technology given the vector of input prices, i.e. it is minimizing the production costs (allocative efficiency). In this paper, given that our dataset covers information about inputs and outputs and not on factors' prices, we focus on technical efficiency. Economic theory underlines that technical efficiency is linked with a frontier, which is called production function, i.e. the locus yielding the maximum achievable output for a given set of inputs.
A production frontier may be estimated using parametric methods (e.g.
COLS or Stochastic Frontiers) and non-parametric methods (e.g. Data Envelopment Analysis-DEA). DEA methods are linear programming techniques with two major drawbacks: they do not allow for statistical inference and they do not specify a functional form mapping the relation between inputs and outputs. COLS is a parametric method which does not distinguish between inefficiency and random disturbances. This distinction is instead possible with Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
Since the original contribution of Aigner et al. (1977) , SFA has been widely applied to measure hospitals' efficiency. 12 However this is the first attempt to identify the impact of some PPS induced distortions on hospital's production. In order to investigate the hospitals' technical efficiency we perform a two-steps analysis: first, we estimate a stochastic frontier and identify the impact of the distortions on the hospitals' output. Second, we investigate whether the estimated efficiency scores depend upon the different ownership types, i.e. we want to assess if there is an efficiency gap among private, not-for-profit and public hospitals. This target is achieved by testing whether there exists a significant difference among the mean efficiency scores of the different hospital types.
We estimate a stochastic frontier by applying two econometric methods:
a RE model with time invariant efficiency scores (Pitt and Lee (1981) ) and a TRE model with time variant efficiency scores (Greene (2005a (Greene ( , 2005b ), which allows also to disentangle hospitals' heterogeneity and relative efficiency. Under the RE stochastic frontier model we estimate the following equation:
where i indicates hospital i and t = 1,...,T denotes the year. The dependent variable y it is the observed output of hospital i in period t, α is a constant, β a vector of parameters and x it an observed vector of covariates for hospital i in period t. The error term is split into two components: the term v it represents the white noise residuals, while the term u i represents the hospitals' inefficiency score-which is constant during the period of investigation-and has to be estimated by the model. The error component v it is a two-sided disturbance capturing the effect of noise, while the error component u i (u i ≥ 0) is a one-sided non negative and normally distributed disturbance reflecting the effect of inefficiency. The model is estimable by maximizing the log-likelihood function of the half normal stochastic frontier (see Greene (2005b) , p. 283).
When we apply the TRE model we estimate the following function:
where w i is hospital i's specific unobserved random effect (with normal distribution)-the heterogeneity effect-v it is the white noise error term and u it ≥ 0 is hospital i's time varying inefficiency (with half normal distribution). The model is estimable by maximum simulated likelihood (see Greene (2005b) , p. 288).
The variables we consider to estimate hospitals' efficiency are shown in Table 1 . The hospitals' output is the dependent variable. Following Cleverley (2002), we consider the number of discharges adjusted both for case-mix and for the weight of day-care and outpatient activities on the overall hospital activity.
13 Hence the hospital output is given by the following expression:
with y * it being the total number of discharges case-mix adjusted, y [ Table 1 here] 13 The available dataset does not split the personnel utilization among inpatient, daycare and outpatient activities. Hence it is necessary to consider an output that aggregates all the hospital's activites. Furthermore, during the observed period day-care and outpatient activities have grown consistently; hence it is necessary to consider their weight in the overall hospital output.
physicians (P HY S), nurses (N U RS) and administrative staff (ADM ).
14 Moreover, we include some distinctive hospital features, such as the presence of an emergency department (the dummy EM ERG = 1 if the department is present), the concentration of health services in the treatment of only one pathology (the dummy M ON O = 1 for cardiological, neurological, oncologic and orthopaedic hospitals), the presence of a University within the hospital (the dummy T EACH = 1 if the hospital has a university teaching status) and the management of more than one hospital under the same authority (the dummy GROU P = 1 if the hospital belongs to a group). The distribution of these variables in our sample is described in the next Section. Furthermore, we consider the three distortions described before, i.e. upcoding (U P COD), cream skimming (CRSK H and CRSK M ) and readmissions (READM ), and a time variable T representing the linear trend in technological progress.
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Once we have estimated the hospitals' efficiency score (which is time invariant in the RE model and time variant in the TRE one), we take into account, as pointed out by previous contributions in literature (e.g. Barbetta et al. (2007) , Dafny (2005) and Silverman and Skinner (2004) ), the impact of ownership on efficiency. Following Singh and Coelli (2001) we consider the estimated efficiency scores for public, private and private not-for-profit hospitals and we apply the Kruskal-Wallis test to check for significant differences.
As mentioned previously, we consider two functional forms for the pro-14 All labour variables are computed as full time equivalent employees. The information does not include temporary workers, which may lead to an underestimation of this input, particularly in private hospitals.
15 Concerning the variable READM , the estimation has been performed with ∆=45
following the suggestions of the regional health care officers. In Lombardy Region, since 1998 the regional reimbursement system bears a reduction in the unit reimbursement in case of a readmission within 45 days.
duction frontier, a Cobb Douglas model and a Translog model. Under the
Cobb Douglas model, the equation we estimate is as follows:
where x jit is the input j (i.e. beds, physicians, nurses and administrative staff) in hospital i at period t, z lit is the characteristic l (i.e. the dummies for the presence of an emergency department, of a mono-specialistic activity, of a teaching activity and of belonging to a group) in hospital i at period t, d kit is the level of distortion k (i.e. upcoding, the two dummies for cream skimming and readmissions) in hospital i at period t and T is the time trend.
Furthermore, we also adopt a translog functional form (see Christensen et al. (1973) ) for the production function, and in this case the model we estimate is the following one:
where, differently from the Cobb Douglas functional form displayed in expression (7), we also estimate both the possible interactions between the hospital's inputs and their second order effects. The results will be displayed in Section 5.
The dataset
We investigate a large administrative dataset covering the full population of patients and hospitals operating in the Lombardy Region, with over 20,000,000
admissions, between 1998 and 2007. Since our information come from administrative data we can analyze our research questions over the entire pop-14 ulation and not only over a sample; hence we do not incur in the sample selection error component (Imai et al. (2008) ).
The data are provided by the Health Care Department of the Lombardy Region. We extracted the data concerning all the Hospital Discharge Charts, which include information regarding the patient (gender, age, residence), the hospital (regional code) and the admission (DRG, length of stay, principal and secondary diagnosis-from which comorbidity is computed-, principal and secondary procedures). This dataset has been linked with another database-always provided by the Lombard Health Care Departmentregarding all the hospital's features (beds, physicians, nurses, ownership, presence of emergency unit, etc.).
16 Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics concerning the whole dataset.
The total number of discharges adjusted for case-mix and for hospital activities (i.e. y * it as defined in (6)) has increased during the period (+31%), as well as the case-mix index (CM I +21%); on the contrary we observe a decrease both in the days of stay (DAY S, -24%), in the average length of stay (ALOS, -15%) and in the total number of discharges (DISCH, -12%). This evidence is consistent with the insights reported in literature concerning some general effects of the introduction of PPS (i.e. a reduction in ALOS and number of discharges, compensated by an increase in the day-care and outpatient treatments). Furthermore, we observe an increase in the case-mix and also a worsening of the patient health status: the comorbidity index (COM ORB) increases by 28% during the period. Regarding inputs, the total number of beds decreased over the period (-17%) , showing that the system was running in over-capacity at the beginning of the period. Among the staff, nurses are the only staff category with a small decrease over the period (-1%), while 16 Information are recorded in Access. The data are not public under Italian privacy law.
The Health Care Department of the Lombardy Region may be contacted for discussing the provision of the data with the aim of scientific publications.
physicians show a robust increase (+11%). A small increase (+2%) is observed for administrative staff. Italian hospitals have mainly expanded the employment of physicians.
[ Table 2 here]
In 2007 an emergency unit was active in 65% of hospital, while only 6% of them can be classified as mono-specialistic organization. Academics activity was also performed by 10% of the hospitals and 60% of them are part of a group.
In the dataset, about 54% of the 134 hospitals active in Lombardy are public (72), while about 34% are private (46). The remaining 12% is given by not-for-profit organizations (16). 17 We follow the classification adopted by Barbetta et al. (2007) , and consider as public both Aziende Ospedaliere (hospital enterprises) and Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico Pubblici (public research hospitals); we classify as not-for-profit hospitals both Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico Privati (private research hospitals) and
Ospedali Classificati (hospitals run by religious bodies); private hospitals are the private accredited ones. As stated by Sloan (2000) , the main distinction between private and not-for-profit organization lies in the distribution of accounting profits. The latter do not distribute such profit. Public hospital are controlled by the regional or local governments. 18 See Krishnan (2001) and Vita and Sacher (2001) 
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[ Table 3 here] [ Table 4 here]
[ Table 5 here] Table 6 displays the inputs Pearson correlation index for ownership type.
While there is a high positive correlation between beds and the different staff types (and among the number of physicians, nurses and administrative staff) in not-for-profit and public hospitals, the correlation between beds and physicians is only 0.69 in private ones. The correlation between beds and nurses is 0.83 in private hospitals, and between beds and administrative staff is only 0.78. Moreover the correlation indices among staff are always lower than those observed in the other two hospital types. All these data suggest that private not-for-profit hospitals are very similar to public ones, while private hospitals are smaller and with a lower ratio employment/beds.
[ Table 6 here]
Results
In this Section we present the results of the empirical analysis. We split the evidence in two parts. First (5.1) we display some descriptive statistics about the distribution of the three distortions for ownership type. Second (5.2), we present the estimates of the efficient frontier and the impact of the distortions on hospitals' output and we test whether there exists an ownership ranking according to the estimated efficiency scores. 
The distribution of PPS across hospitals with different ownership
We now present some empirical evidence concerning the distribution of the three PPS distortions in not-for-profit, private and public hospitals, and their dynamics over the observed period. Figure 1 [ Figure 1 here]
It is evident that the behaviour of the three hospital types regarding the distortions is heterogeneous. 21 The three hospital types demonstrate a rather uniform behaviour concerning upcoding, differently from Silverman and Skinner (2004) and Dafny (2005) , who reported a higher upcoding activity in private hospitals. In our dataset private hospitals were more engaged in this practice only during the period 2003-2005. In the remaining years their behaviour was similar to that of the other hospitals. Moreover, we observe an increasing trend in this distortion and a convergence among the different ownership types during the period of investigation.
22
The index for treatment cream skimming is much higher for private hospitals, while this distortion is small in not-for-profit and public hospitals.
Moreover, the convergence between the two latter types seems to increase with time and their activity concerning this distortion seems to decrease.
This new insight confirms some expectations among the profession (i.e. private hospitals do select the treatments), but it is the first attempt to quantify them. Another interesting result is that not-for-profit and public hospitals exhibit the same very low level of treatment cream skimming.
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Figure 1 also shows the general trend for the readmission distortion.
All the indices decrease over the period. Not-for-profit hospitals produce a higher distortion, while the private ones show the lowest level. We provide Sloan (2000) , which argues that for-profit and notfor-profit hospitals are far more alike than different. It is closer to Silverman and Skinner (2004) , and the difference between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals may be due to the presence of altruism (Newhouse (1970) ) and vocational purposes.
two possible explanations for this evidence: (1) More severe controls on the activity of private hospitals on this distortion, which may be more easily checked by the regulator than the previous ones. (2) As mentioned previously, two effects could have an impact on readmissions: reputation and opportunistic behavior. The reputation effect may be stronger if we consider not-for-profit and public hospitals (see Newhouse (1970) , Hansmann (1980)): they have more readmissions because of a better reputation. The latter induces a highest share of less healthy patients, which require repeated and more frequent treatments.
The estimates of technical efficiency for Italian hospitals
In this Section we present the estimates of efficiency for Italian hospitals and we observe whether there is a difference according to the ownership types. The Shapiro and Wilk (1965) normality test on the dependent variable (i.e. the case-mix, hospital-activity adjusted discharges) shows that there is no evidence of non-normality of this sample (see Tables 7-8) . 24 Moreover, the Levene test shows that the residuals are homoscedastic 25 . The Durbin-Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) index for input multicollinearity shows that inputs are not influenced by multicollinearity.
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[ Table 7 here]
[ Table 8 here]
The econometric results shown in Tables (9)- (10) are robust to the different specifications, with very few exceptions. In all the models the input variables are highly significant with positive coefficients, with the exception of administrative staff under the translog functional form.
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[ Table 9 here]
[ Table 10 here] Regarding hospital's characteristics, the presence of an emergency department increases the efficiency under both econometric models. In fact, it seems that, even though hospitals have to assign, for the presence of an emergency unit, some assets (beds) and labour inputs in order to be able to respond to the peaks in emergency, they are able to admit more patients, and often less healthy and more complicated ones. Under these circumstances the and VIF(log(ADM )=7.31. The rule proposed by Kutner et al. (2004) is that a value of V IF ≥ 10 is an indication of potential multicollinearity problems. 28 The two input variables having the highest impact on the hospitals' output are the number of beds and nurses in the Cobb Douglas models, while physicians have the lowest coefficient. In the RE model the sum of the input coefficients is consistent with increasing returns to scale, while in the TRE model we observe decreasing returns to scale.
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emergency unit generates an increase in the number of admissions. As expected, mono-specialistic hospitals are more efficient than pluri-specialist ones. The presence of academics activity within the hospitals has a negative impact on the production frontier under the Cobb Douglas functional form, while there is no statistically significant effect under the translog model. If more than one hospital is controlled by the same authority production is lower: analyzed hospitals have some difficulties to deal with multiplant technologies. The sign of the time variable, capturing the shift in technology,
shows an increase in the production frontier over the observed period. Last, we analyze the impact on hospitals' efficiency of the three distortions. Upcoding and treatment cream skimming reduce the hospitals efficiency in all the models. This means that hospitals with high upcoding either suffer of a Leibenstein X-inefficiency factor since they obtain higher revenues thanks to the distortions (see Leibenstein (1966) ), or they choose to treat less cases to justify the presence of treatments with high DRG weights.
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Regarding treatment cream skimming, again the possible explanations may be a Leibenstein X-inefficiency factor and the lower number of discharges 29 Leibenstein introduces the theory of inefficiency generated from non-competition. It may be summarized as follows: "For a variety of reasons people and organisations normally work neither as hard or as effectively as they could. In situations where competitive pressure is light, many people will trade the disutility of greater effort, or search for the utility of feeling less pressure and of better interpersonal relations." Essentially, there will be a slack in cost control and in the amount of effort put in by management and workers.
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due to treatment selection (the management chooses to focus the activity on some treatments but this effect is not compensated by the reduction in discharges due to the restriction in the DRGs treated).
Readmissions have a strong positive impact on efficiency, because, as expected, this practice increases the hospital's output; however, it is likely that this is due to an opportunistic behaviour (not to an efficiency effect).
These results yield some suggestions for changes to the reimbursement policies which will be briefly discussed in our conclusion.
We can now analyze the efficiency ranking according to the hospital ownership. If we compute the partial productivity measures (see Table 11 ), i.e.
output per input, we observe that private hospitals have the largest values for physicians, nurses and administrative staff, while public structures have the lowest measures. On the contrary, the ranking is the opposite if we consider beds. A more robust analysis can be performed using the estimated efficiency scores.
[ Table 11 here] Table 12 shows the average estimated efficiency score for public, notfor-profit and private hospitals under the two econometric models and for the translog functional form (the same results hold for the Cobb Douglas function form). We consider the efficiency scores (i.e. Exp(−u i ), u i ≥ 0) estimated using only the inputs as covariates.
Under the RE model-where a time invariant efficiency score is estimated for each hospital-the average efficiency score of public hospitals is greater than that for not-for-profit hospitals; the lowest average is for private ones. Table ? ? also displays the Kruskal-Wallis test for statistically significant differences in the ownership average efficiency scores. Based on these tests, the null hypothesis of no difference between the technical efficiency scores of the two ownership types is investigated. Under the RE model the null hy-pothesis is rejected only for public and private hospitals, i.e. public hospitals are statistically more efficient than private ones. No statistically significant difference is observed with not-for-profit hospitals.
Hence public hospitals are technically more efficient than private ones, as shown by Puig-Junoy (1998) for Spanish hospitals and Zuckerman et al.
(1994) for the US ones and differently by Wilson and Jadlow (1982) . This ranking can be explained by considering the estimated input coefficients, the partial productivity measures and the inputs correlation across ownership types. Private hospitals have the lowest partial productivity measure for beds, which is the input with the largest coefficient in the estimated production frontier. For these reasons they have the lowest ranking in technical efficiency. If we consider that private hospitals exhibit also the lowest correlation between beds and personnel, this implies that they employ less physicians, nurses and administrative staff per beds. In this way private hospitals probably reduce labor costs.
If we consider the TRE model, where a time-variant efficiency score is estimated, we can observe if there are differences in the efficiency trends. We find that at the beginning of the period public and not-for-profit hospitals are more efficient than private ones. On the contrary, at the end of the period (year 2007) no significant difference among the average efficiency scores of the three ownership types is observed (as shown by Vitaliano and Toren (1996) , Sloan (2000) and Barbetta et al. (2007) ). Hence the regional system has became more homogenous according to technical efficiency estimates. This is probably due to a more stringent regulation, since the fulfillments required in order to be part of the mixed health care regional system have been tightened over the period.
[ Table 12 here]
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This paper provides some indices to measure three typical PPS distortions:
upcoding, treatment cream skimming and readmissions. Moreover, these distortions are introduced as covariates to investigate the efficiency of hospitals in Lombardy.
The main results are the following. First, readmissions are the most relevant distortion, since they significantly increase hospitals' output. Second, cream skimming and upcoding have a negative impact on efficiency.
Third, private hospitals are particularly engaged in treatment cream skimming, while this distortion is very low in public and not-for-profit hospitals.
Fourth, no ownership differences are observed if we look at upcoding (differently from Silverman and Skinner (2004) and Dafny (2005) Cream skimming index Kruskal-Wallis tests RE model Hypothesis P -value Critical value Decision T E P RI = T E N F P 0.51 0.05 Accepted T E P RI = T E P U B 0.003 0.05 Rejected T E P U B = T E N F P 0.53 0.05 Accepted TRE model-year 1998 Hypothesis P -value Critical value Decision T E P RI = T E N F P 0.03 0.05 Rejected T E P RI = T E P U B 0.00 0.05 Rejected T E P U B = T E N F P 0.52 0.05 Accepted TRE model-year 2007 Hypothesis P -value Critical value Decision T E P RI = T E N F P 0.85 0.05 Accepted T E P RI = T E P U B 0.18 0.05 Accepted T E P U B = T E N F P 0.20 0.05 Accepted 
